A Necessary Superintending Control over Poor Judgment

[XLFD]

As previously discussed here, a very troubling opinion came down from Judge Susan Sniegowski over granting myself the leave to file a quo warranto complaint against two Scottville citizens who entered into their city commissioner offices unlawfully.  It arrived in my mailbox on February 13th, ironically the very day of a Scottville City Commission meeting, so it dampened my momentum in that pursuit of justice for the citizens of Scottville who deserve to have their city leaders follow the law.  

As explained, the 'opinion an order' denied me my right to argue the legal merits of my amply supported case against the impostors, Rob Alway and Marcy Spencer, in a court of law, yet Judge Sniegowski ignored those merits as a basis, and instead used an inapplicable law to suggest it wasn't filed timely against Alway, and ancient precedents suggesting I had no standing to file as I wasn't claiming any legal right to either seat.  The relevant and recent law discrediting all legal merits of her opinion was right there in my lawsuit, had she decided to look it over.  

It was rather dispiriting seeing such a flawed opinion and order, but I quickly decided that her honor wouldn't get away with a legally unsubstantiated opinion a third time in cases I brought before her.  In the prior two times, I was able to snatch partial victories by working with defendant attorneys and getting public records through the process and a modest settlement.  This time it would be a shutout, although I could probably get my filing fees refunded by the court if I pursued that route.

  

So I did the research with my limited legal resources to find what I could do to prevent her from quashing this effort.  As I was seeking equitable relief I had to wade through the various writs I could apply for from the Michigan Appeals Court (seen above) since a normal appeal wouldn't work (as the complaint was denied its filing).  At first it looked like a writ of mandamus might be the way, then a writ of certiorari may be the way to go, but then I came across a writ of superintending control which seemed to fit best, and had basically supplanted some of the others as court remedies.

This was a very difficult complaint to draft for the court of appeals as few examples of superintending control complaints existed to draw from, and higher courts often are sticklers for proper formats.  I figured I had a strong legal basis for this appeal so it was important I could relate all of the information supporting my right to file the original complaint, and working against the assertions made by Judge Sniegowski.  I filed the Superintending Control complaint along with supporting exhibits on February 28th, I served it earlier today (3-3-23) to Judge Sniegowski. 

It seeks to have the three judges assigned to the case reverse the denial to file with high hopes of them giving the judge some much-needed direction in fairly resolving the issues of the case.  Unfortunately, the prospect of petitioning the appeals court to appoint one of the other fairer Mason County judges to the case or disqualify a bad-judgment judge is nearly impossible in execution, so even if I am successful here, I just might find myself back in a court where the prevailing laws has no effect on the judge if it doesn't fall on the right side of the case, from her perspective.

COMPLAINT FOR WRIT OF SUPERINTENDING CONTROL

Plaintiff Tom Rotta brings this original action before the Michigan Court of Appeals seeking a writ of superintending control over the 51st Circuit Court of Mason County. In support of this request plaintiff states as follows:

I. Nature of Action:

1. This is an action pursuant to MCR 3.302 and MCR 7.203, seeking a writ of superintending control over 51st Circuit Court Judge Susan Sniegowski, ordering her to retract the opinion and order denying plaintiff's leave to file his quo warranto complaint against two individuals alleged to have unlawfully entered their offices submitted to her court.

2. Plaintiff submitted to the 51st Circuit Court an application for special leave to file a quo warranto complaint, offering 57 paragraphs doubling as his complaint and describing the factual and legal bases indicating two people in his county had entered into their public office unlawfully. Defendant Sniegowski drafted her opinion and order, dated 2-9-2023, with substantial misrepresentations of the factual record and with significant misapplication of relevant law and precedent in the justifications she offered in support of her denial.

3. The defendant in her opinion and order abused her discretion in making a decision that fell outside principled outcomes by erroneously applying an irrelevant statute and suggesting that five court decisions, none less than 91 years old, trumped what current statutes and Michigan Court Rules clearly say by stating that plaintiff was barred from filing such a complaint, curtailing a right of plaintiff acknowledged by prevailing law asserted throughout his complaint.

4. This action is filed to regain that legal right carelessly denied plaintiff through the extraordinary power of superintending control this court can grant and being there is no other adequate legal curative for this preliminary decision that denied leave to file under court rules and statute.

II. Parties

5. Plaintiff Tom Rotta (hereafter ROTTA) is an adult resident and qualified elector of Mason County Michigan.

6. The defendant in this action is 51st Circuit Court Judge Susan Sniegowski (hereafter SNIEGOWSKI) who has the powers, authorities, obligations and duties granted to that position in the Michigan Judicature Act and the Michigan Court Rules and in specificity for this case, the power under MCR 3.306(B)(2) to grant or deny a leave to file a quo warranto complaint against those who have allegedly entered their office unlawfully.

III. Jurisdiction

7. Pursuant to MCR 3.302 and MCR 7.203(C)(1), this court has original jurisdiction over a complaint seeking a writ of superintending control over the circuit courts of the state.

8. Under MCR 3.302 this court has the power to issue writs of superintending control over a circuit court if that court is violating clear legal duties and if plaintiff has no adequate legal remedies other than the writ sought.

9. Through denying Plaintiff ROTTA leave to file his quo warranto lawsuit suitably justified by his quo warranto complaint (hereafter QWC) doubling as a brief to support his leave to file, Judge SNIEGOWSKI has deprived ROTTA the right to file his QWC and argue the points misrepresented and the law misapplied in Judge SNIEGOWSKI's opinion and order.

10. ROTTA has no adequate legal remedy to challenge the administrative action of Judge SNIEGOWSKI's denial of leave other than to seek a writ of superintending control.

IV. Background facts.

  A. Summary of quo warranto complaint considered by Defendant SNIEGOWSKI

11. The Application for Special Leave to File QWC and accompanying QWC, stating and arguing the reasons for granting leave, were submitted to Judge SNIEGOWSKI on January 23, 2023 (EXHIBIT A).

12. The facts and arguments presented in the QWC use state law and the Scottville City Charter to make the case that two people (ALWAY and SPENCER) unlawfully entered into the offices of Scottville City Commissioner and that a special election was needed to fill those seats according to the prevailing law.

13. Summarized, the QWC details with specificity of fact and law that at the 11-8-2022 election, original defendant ALWAY was reelected to the city commission and original defendant SPENCER was not. Two days later, on 11-10-2022 ALWAY resigned very publicly and in writing (EXHIBIT B), saying he would not serve his second term.

14. That term began officially at 7:30 PM on 11-14-2022 according to charter, whereas the old term ended. A partial term commissioner seat was left unfilled by the 11-8-2022 election as no qualified candidate ran for the spot. Two vacancies on the seven-member commission existed at that point.

15. On 11-16-2022, ALWAY would 'rescind his resignation' by sending an email to the city clerk (EXHIBIT C). This would be accepted by the city attorney and most city leaders as filling the vacancy his resignation had made,

16. State law MCL 201.3(2) indicates his position was titular only as a vacancy was created by his resignation and not filled in accordance with the city charter, which mandated the remaining commissioners appoint a successor within 30 days and if no appointment is made, that a special election be held.

17. ALWAY would not be appointed within 30 days of the vacancy created (i.e. by the end of 12-14-2022), nor would the partial term left vacant on 11-14-2022 be filled within that time. The city charter had only one alternative for filling the vacancies created at this point: to hold a special election.

18. SPENCER would be appointed at the 12-27-2022 meeting of the commission, 43 days after the vacancy was created. Both would act in the official capacity of a city commissioner though their authority appears to be titular only.

19. After ROTTA and some commissioners noted the apparent impropriety, ROTTA drafted and filed in the circuit court the QWC and the Application for leave to file the QWC on the bases noted above.

20. On 2-9-2023, Judge SNIEGOWSKI drafted her opinion and order (EXHIBIT D) denying leave to file the QWC, citing untimeliness under an inapplicable statute and alleging, contrary to court rules, that ROTTA effectively lacked standing to file as he failed to show he had a right to the offices in question in his complaint.

21. ROTTA would file this Complaint for Writ of Superintending Control arguing SNIEGOWSKI's opinion and order rested on errors of law and fact, and that she abused her discretion in making a decision that fell outside the range of principled outcomes, contrary to her clear legal duty to ROTTA to judiciously interpret the facts and laws of the matter to determine the merits of whether leave should be granted.

V. Legal bases for a writ of superintendent control due to error of law, abuse of discretion

22. To obtain an order of superintending control, a party must establish that the inferior tribunal failed to perform a clear legal duty and that there is no adequate legal remedy. re Gosnell, 234 Mich App 326, 333; 594 NW2d 90 (1999) at 341.

23. A court abuses its discretion if its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). A decision that rests on an error of law falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Kidder v Ptacin, 284 Mich App 166, 170; 771 NW2d 806 (2009). Superintending control is also proper where the court committed an error of law. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge (On Remand), 167 Mich.App. 282, 284, 421 N.W.2d 665 (1988). [In re Lafayette Towers, supra at 272, 503 N.W.2d 740.]

24. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of superintending control when there is an inadequate legal remedy and the general practices of the inferior court are contrary to a clear legal duty Lockhart v. 36th Dist. Judge, 204 Mich.App. 684, 516 N.W.2d 76 (1994)

VI. Errors of law and fact in Judge SNIEGOWSKI's 2-9-2023 opinion and order.

25. Each sentence after the first in the opinion and order [EXHIBIT D) that does not quote precedent is either erroneous in law or erroneously stated with the facts presented in the complaint leading to an error of law in its misapplication. These errors of law are substantial and will be looked at sentence by sentence in this complaint.

26. Second sentence: "The application alleges impropriety in the election of defendant's Rob Alway and Marcy Spencer."

As noted in paragraph 13 and as seen in the QWC, there is no allegation of impropriety in the 11-8-2022 election at all. A vacancy was created by Alway resigning after the election and by nobody running for a partial seat in the election. The only impropriety alleged in the complaint was how those vacancies were filled after they were created on 11-14-2022, after an election that is uncontroverted by ROTTA in the original complaint.

27. Third sentence: "The application alleges election fraud and was filed on or about January 23, 2023."

As seen in the QWC, election fraud is never alleged nor implied regarding an election that is uncontroverted by ROTTA in the original complaint. This would lead to a gross misapplication of law in the next two sentences.

28. Fourth sentence: "MCL 600.4545 provides that an action for quo warranto must be brought within 30 days after such election."

  a. MCL 600.4545 deals strictly with material election fraud or error issues as pertains only to constitutional amendments, ballot questions, or propositions. This was not the nature of the quo warranto relief sought in the complaint, as election fraud or error was never alleged, ROTTA clearly filing for quo warranto relief for usurpation of office (MCL 600.4505-4515), mentioning statutes from that section twice.

  b. Under MCR 3.306 and MCL 600.4505-4515. actions for quo warranto against a person(s) who usurped an office has no condition for filing within 30 days of an election-- an election that isn't even relevant in this usurpation case-- ergo, ROTTA's QWC was timely brought to the court.

29. Fifth sentence: "Pursuant to MCL 600.4545 the complaint must also be brought against the municipality if fraud in the election is the allegation."

  a. As noted, election fraud was never alleged or implied, and the statute noted only applies to ballot questions and the like not for usurpation of office.

  b. MCR 3.306(C) clearly indicates an action alleging usurpation of office is properly filed against the party allegedly holding the office unlawfully. MCL 600.4505-4515 also indicates the alleged usurper is the defendant in such actions.

30. Sixth sentence: " [For Alway] the application for leave to file QWC was not filed within the 30 period after the action complained about in November 2022."

This is just a reiteration of the faulty conclusion in sentence four absolving Alway by using an inapplicable law and it's inapplicable timeliness constraints, as noted.

31. Seventh sentence: "With respect to the complaints against both defendants, plaintiff is not a proper party to file an action for quo warranto."

  a. In the application for leave, ROTTA offers MCR 3.306(B)(2) which says: "Other actions for quo warranto [not described in the prior subsection, which this isn't] may be brought by the prosecuting attorney of the proper county, without leave of court, or by a citizen of the county by special leave of the court."

  b. In paragraph 4 of the original complaint, ROTTA states he is a citizen of Mason County, where Scottville is located, and is thus a proper party, as long as he can receive special leave of the court.

32. After quoting five precedents dated 1888, 1891, 1899, 1919, and 1932 to unsuccessfully justify her seventh sentence and lead to her conclusion, she concludes in her eighth and ninth sentence: "The complaint as presented to the court does not allege plaintiff has a right to either office. As such he is not a proper plaintiff and the application for leave to file quo warranto complaint is denied."

  a. The refutations in the prior paragraph apply here.

  b. Additionally, MCR 3.306(C) says that plaintiffs may add the rightful holder of the seat as a party, indicating the plaintiff need not have a right to the office: "If the action is brought against the defendant for usurping an office, the complaint may name the person rightfully entitled to the office, with an allegation of his or her right to it, and that person may be made a party."

  c. Additionally, this court has decided numerous recent cases involving quo warranto actions from plaintiffs/appellants who were not entitled to the office they filed against: Heywood v. Holden (unpublished 2002), Zoran v. Fiscelli (2015, quo warranto rendered moot by Fiscelli's resignation), etc.

  d. ROTTA's claim was that the two offices have no rightful claimant as the period of time for the Scottville City Commission to fill a vacancy by appointment has passed, and a special election is required by application of relevant state law and the city charter. SNIEGOWSKI's opinion suggests no citizen could challenge the propriety of anybody who intruded into those two offices, even when it's obviously not done lawfully.

33. In summary, Defendant Judge SNIEGOWSKI:

  a. Neglects ROTTA's QWC allegations of usurpation of office, instead claims the QWC alleges improprieties in an election and election fraud, when it objectively doesn't.

  b. Applies irrelevant law in this case to opine that the complaint is not filed timely and against the wrong party.

  c. Denies ROTTA the right to file the QWC, citing five ancient precedents (all addressing QWCs in usurpation of office actions, not election fraud as she initially claims ROTTA's QWC is) that supposedly show that only those entitled to the office in question can file a QWC against an office and ignoring current court rules and recent precedent that show otherwise.

VII. The lower court abused its discretion by deciding multiple issues of law erroneously and outside the range of principled outcomes.

34. Superintending control is an extraordinary power that may be invoked when the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant's failure to perform a clear legal duty and the absence of an adequate legal remedy. In re Recorder's Court Bar Ass'n v. Wayne Circuit Court, 443 Mich. 110, 134, 503 N.W.2d 885 (1993);  Lockhart v. Thirty-Sixth Dist. Court Judge, 204 Mich.App. 684, 688, 516 N.W.2d 76 (1994). Superintending control is also proper where the court committed an error of law. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge (On Remand), 167 Mich.App. 282, 284, 421 N.W.2d 665 (1988).

35. The lower court made multiple wrongful assumptions and errors of law in its opinion and order denying ROTTA the right to file his QWC.

36. This court addressed a very similar dilemma earlier this year, In re Miller, No. 364659 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023) [EXHIBIT E] where it found for the plaintiff's motion for immediate consideration, rendering their superintending control complaint as moot.

37. This court opined in that case: "The facts before this Court indicate that Mr. Clemons accepted appointment to a new office on December 6, 2022, at which point his county commissioner's seat became vacant. The Board did not fill that vacancy by appointment within 30 days, so at this time it appears that the Board must call a special election to fill that vacancy."

38. As noted in the QWC, MCL 201.37 indicates vacancies are to be filled in the manner described for filling vacancies in a Home Rule City's charter. The city charter described the same filling process in paragraph 37, found in section 6.6 of the Scottville charter using the mandatory directive "shall".

39. The two vacancies created on the Scottville Commission at 7:30 PM on 11-14-2022, could have been filled by appointment by the remaining commission within 30 days; they weren't, so the only alternative for filling the offices was to hold a special election to fill them.

40. Accordingly, Alway 'reclaiming' an office he vacated two days prior and Spencer's appointment 43 days after the vacancy opened were improper acts, and they should be removed from office until proper procedures (a special election) finds the lawful successors to those offices.

41. Plaintiff ROTTA and other commissioners (since resigned from their offices due to the repugnance of the usurpations and other reasons) attempted to assert the clear rules of filling vacancies but were thwarted by a Scottville city attorney supported by ascendant political forces led by the two alleged usurpers. This led to the original application for leave to file in the lower court, and its denial led to this filing for superintendent control.

VIII. Relief requested

42. Therefore, Plaintiff ROTTA respectfully requests that the court enter an order directing 51st Circuit Court Judge SNIEGOWSKI to:

  a. vacate her opinion and order dated 2-9-2023.

  b. enjoin Alway and Spencer from further occupation of the two Scottville City Commission seats until her court can address the merits of ROTTA's QWC and determine their legitimacy or lack thereof.

  c. abide by the laws of the state and the Michigan Court Rules in forming a principled conclusion after assessing and interpreting the facts of this matter with due diligence.

43. Plaintiff ROTTA also respectfully requests this court issues such other writs and orders as the court in good conscience believes are required by the complaint.

Respectfully submitted

[Freedom Seeker]

Wow! Really in depth and complicated work, X, but makes simple sense ... especially in "every sentence after the first" in rebutting Sniegowski's opinion. I think that's enough to make Sniegowski drop her robe.

[XLFD]

I think the judicial accessory you may want to use instead of her robe is her gavel; if it was a love letter, maybe it would have achieved your result, FS.

Thanks for your assessment, I know you have some legal acumen from your past posts.  I hope the appeals court judges will see that her opinion's multiple errors throughout could have only been formed by a judge who may have such a bias (either against me, or for Alway and or Spencer) that a principled decision may have to be formed for her.  I think any honest observer at this point can see I won't get fairness in her court without some outside help.

[Freedom Seeker]

Ha ha! Maybe Sniegowski will consider your Writ a love letter! I realize that conclusion may have sounded racy after Ithought more, but decided to leave it ... because honestly my first thought was truly the symbolism of justice and I meant that maybe she should hang up her robe and get out of the job. She certainly doesn't seem to be making decisions based on law. Prayers for a higher Judge to step in!

What does a judge robe symbolize?
A. A judge's robe is like a uniform. It shows that the judge represents the judicial branch of government. The robe reminds everyone that the judge interprets the law and makes decisions according to the law.

Many thanks for your courage to fight for justice and for the law to be upheld.

[Willy]

This is a perfect example of why we all must do our research on those running for the bench. The power these people have is mind boggling. What they decide can make or break some one personally and financially especially if the judge gets it wrong. Attorney fees alone can put people so far in debt that it may be impossible for them to recoup from the ordeal. If X had to hire an attorney, this convoluted situation in Scottville may never have seen the light of day because of expensive attorney fees. X however has taken it on himself to learn the ins and outs of the legal system and we should all thank him profusely for doing just that. Corruption in Mason County has an opponent named Rotta.The way I read this case is that Judge Susan Sniegowski can hand down a ruling that she sees as fitting the legal questions involved, however I do believe she did not properly research this case. If the Court of Appeals rules in Rotta's favor and she gets the case back in her court then she can uphold her first decision. So my question is, can you request that this case be sent to another judge if this is decided in your favor? This link has a description of what a judges duties are.

[XLFD]

I can request the judge be disqualified from a case, but there is a very high bar for such actions, since savvy attorneys could use it in shopping for judges who might be more favorable to their case.  

I already had some heavy lifting to do, going to the appeals court as a pro se litigant looking to have an established judge effectively overruled.  I didn't think it practical to list the other two times her decision has fell outside the realm of principled outcomes, since it would have taken some of the blunt energy out of my COA complaint, which lists several errors in just this one opinion.  I would have had to commit a lot of ink to paper to set up and make the case that her prior opinions were unjustified, and even then run the risk of having it be misunderstood as a misperception on my part.