On May 17, 2016, I am poised to go to the 51st Circuit Court to find out the results of a Summary Disposition Hearing for my third lawsuit with the City of Ludington over failure to disclose public records as per the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  Neither side disputes the general facts of the case, the only matters to decide are the matters of law, which makes it extremely likely that this case will be decided on this Tuesday. 

The facts and laws in this case have me feeling rather confident that this will be another one for the win column for the people of Ludington.  Additionally, if the local court agrees with punitive damages against the City of Ludington, it could make more people aware of the 'information crisis' that has existed in this fair city for way too long, even before I was making FOIA requests. 

Our two local print media, the City of Ludington Daily News (COLDNews) and Mason County Press, who seem perfectly fine with running press releases from our officials telling us what a great job they are doing and why those people speaking up at meetings are so misguided, can report on other things or include any reports of these cases in a 'related' criminal court case, absent any context of wondering why the Ludington City Hall is criminally withholding records from the public. 

The so-called journalists of those outlets would rather link these FOIA lawsuits I keep winning (because of our local public bodies failure to do their job properly and lawfully with criminal activity)since they cannot justify their own poor performances in keeping the public informed on issues that matter.  City Manager John Shay lies about the drinking water being lead-free, and their reaction is "Who cares?".  The City leaders sit on a report that shows massive contamination in one of the city's recreational areas, home to many marinas and a public access, while they and the media focuses on a meaningless Outside Magazine contest

In the latest installment of FOIA lawsuits, the initial complaint and exhibits were put out in early March here at the Ludington Torch:  Lud FOIA Lawsuit: Payroll Records   Exhibits 1-8    Exhibits 9-14A.  To completely understand the brief that follows, make sure you read that first link.  A quick summation:  portions of a police payroll record were withheld on specious grounds, I objected, the city council rejected my objections, I filed a lawsuit to get the records. 

After the City's lawyer submitted an Answer to my complaint that agreed to the facts of the case, but disagreed with the legal consequences, they filed a Motion for Summary Disposition (as seen here  Mot 4 SD Defendant.pdf  with an explanation here:  Brief Summary Disp Def..pdf )

Summarizing the other party's assertions, the police chief initially claimed in an affidavit that he had not the authority to release the name and hours worked of one of his officers six months prior.  When first appealed, the FOIA Coordinator claimed two exemptions, saying that the exemption was done to protect the name of an undercover officer (working openly for SSCENT) and the hours worked were 'operational instructions'. 

In the brief, the attorney wisely disregards those flimsy exemptions and asserts that the data was withheld because of a pending legal case involving the requester, and that gave them the power to do so.  They relate that this late-claimed exemption validated their initial denial. 

In the brief that follows (which is anything but brief) with an abundance of links to relevant data, I attempt to show that the 'pending civil case exemption' they utilize is irrelevant and moot since they continued to withhold the records from plaintiff even after the prior case was resolved.  Furthermore, I attempt to debunk their two earlier claims for exemptions as ineligible for consideration under the law.  Lastly, I make the case for punitive damages to be invoked by the court for the unlawful actions and omissions rendered by the City of Ludington and their agents in trying to once again keep public records away from the public's eyes. 

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION   FOR   SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

                                                  I.  INTRODUCTION

This civil action involves the non-disclosure of two elements from a police department payroll record that the plaintiff, Tom Rotta, requested from the defendant, City of Ludington.  The two exemptions were initially claimed to be for identifying an undercover officer and disclose operational instructions, further explained by an affidavit from defendant's police chief saying he did not have the authority to release the department's drug enforcement (SSCENT) officer's name or the hours he worked in a week six months before the request was made. 

The FOIA Coordinator further opined for plaintiff's administrative appeal that he believed the information may assist a third party, Gene Foster, in providing for his defense.  Foster was arrested during the time period covered by the payroll record by the SSCENT officer and the coordinator offered this as an additional factor in not disclosing the full record.  Plaintiff lost the administrative appeal in October in front of the defendant’s city council.

After this court ruled in a February summary disposition hearing that plaintiff had prevailed in a 'related' case (that defendant has dubbed 'FOIA suit 1' in their brief) by finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the records he requested regarding the arrest of Foster and in possession of the defendant, plaintiff informally challenged the city to reevaluate this earlier denial at the city council meeting held three days after the ruling, and on his website.  When no interest was shown by any of the defendant's agents, this lawsuit was served on the council at the following meeting requesting relief including disclosure of the full payroll record, along with punitive and bad faith penalties, identifying the arbitrary and capricious nature of the way the city chose to handle this response. 

Defendant's answer to that lawsuit was quickly followed by a Motion of Summary Disposition which this brief is in response to.  Defendant avoided any justification of the two earlier exemptions they used in a seemingly questionable manner, preferring to introduce an exemption that appears to be stronger.  Defendant argues over the course of their brief that the 'FOIA 1 lawsuit' allowed them to exempt the 'related' data they withheld in this case, and such arguments may have had merits and withstood judicial interpretation. 

In this response, however, plaintiff will show that defendant's argument is a moot point irrelevant to this case due to their admissions and omissions.  Plaintiff will incorporate this in showing that the defendant continues to refuse or delay the release of the relevant portion of these records in an arbitrary, capricious and bad faith way to this very day.

 

                                          II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff's initial complaint and exhibits describes the events leading up to the commencement of this lawsuit, with little dispute from the defendant's answer other than in the legal conclusions.  Likewise, in the defendant's statement of facts in the motion brief are not in controversy to the plaintiff. 

Supplemental material since the filing of the defendant's supplementary disposition motion include the final order which closed 'FOIA suit 1' signed April 13, 2016 by the Honorable Peter Wadel representing this court (PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT 15) just after a hearing concerning the wording of that order.   It also includes the check stub from the defendant's attorney attached to a check paying off their liability to the plaintiff from 'FOIA suit 1', marked as full and final settlement in their register (PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT 16).  Absent from this supplemental material at the filing of this response on May 9, 2016 is any amended response from defendant disclosing the withheld material being sought in this lawsuit.

                                            III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary disposition on the basis of subrule (C)(8) should be granted only when the claim "is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery." Kuhn v Secretary of State, 228 Mich.App. 319, 324; 579 N.W.2d 101 (1998). GM Sign, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 301742 (2012).

Subrule C(8) is unfounded as plaintiff followed the guidelines of the state FOIA in pursuing relief under the Act, including seeking administrative review, before filing a claim in court seeking undisclosed portion of records, and other remedies offered by the Act at the time of filing, which offers ways to grant relief.

When reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a Court considers the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The Cadle Co v City of Kentwood, 285 Mich
App 240, 247; 776 NW2d 145 (2009). A motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) is properly granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Campbell v Human Servs Dep’t, 286
Mich App 230, 235; 780 NW2d 586 (2009).

The claims and remedies made by plaintiff are supported by, and consistent with, the facts and FOIA statute in this case, so this would be improper as well.  Subrule MCR 2.116(I)(2) permits a court to render judgment in favor of the opposing party if it appears to the court “that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Washburn v Michailoff, 240 Mich App 669, 672; 613 NW2d 405 (2000).

 

                                        IV. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS:

A)  Claiming MCL 15.243(1)(v) as a proper exemption is a moot point without subsequent disclosure of records at the conclusion of 'FOIA Suit 1'. 

Defendant in his brief effectively ignores any merits of their previous attempt at two exemptions under MCL 15.243(1)(s), instead introducing the new exemption of MCL 15.243(1)(v) which corresponds to "Records or information relating to a civil action in which the requesting party and the public body are parties.", what I will call the civil action exemption.  They accurately portray the history of the statute, and explain why it's relevant to this case and how it can be introduced at this point.

Without arguing over the merits of those explanations, the point is rendered moot by the subsequent events following the brief's submission.  In  Krug v Ingham County Sheriff’s Office, 264 Mich App 475; 691 NW2d 50 (2004), the appeals court found after this section of law was in effect that a FOIA lawsuit was a continuing request for information that was initially claimed to be exempt "Defendant had denied plaintiff's request and plaintiff had filed suit in this matter.   Accordingly, defendant would already have been monitoring this file more closely and could easily have released the information as soon as it became nonexempt.   As such, we find that the trial court properly considered plaintiff's lawsuit a continuing request for information under the FOIA and ordered its release." 

So when 'FOIA Suit 1" was finalized and paid off, which happened after the defendant wrote their brief, the civil action exemption would no longer be in effect.  Claiming no other exemption in their motion, including the originally claimed exemptions in their FOIA response, the record should have been released with the one LPD officer's name and hours worked unredacted.  Since April 13 when the final order was agreed to, or even up to April 20, when defendants sent the settlement check, these records have not been released to the plaintiff despite there being no exemptions applicable as per defendant’s conclusions in their brief.

This required no further action by the plaintiff, just by the defendant:  "The [FOIA] statute does not indicate that a party is required to resubmit an FOIA request to ensure that it receives the requested information if the public body determines that the information has become nonexempt during the course of litigation." Krug, Supra.

When the plaintiff offered the city council the ability to properly respond to the October 2015 request by bringing it before them after the decision was informally made in this court for "FOIA Suit 1' in February 2016, plaintiff was cognizant that the civil action exemption should have no longer applied even if they decided to use it.  It would have been a questionable act of judicial discretion after that time to believe the name of the officer and his hours worked during a week in March had any relation to 'FOIA Suit 1' when that action was, for all intents and purposes, decided in this court of record.

Defendant claims it is indisputable that the city may properly assert the civil action exemption, that the two parties were in other civil action together and that the two lawsuits were related.  Even ceding all those points, it is immaterial after the other civil action dissipated, and the records would no longer have an exemption for disclosure, as per the defendant's brief.  Being that it is much longer than five business days after the material became exempt, whichever date this court prefers to use, the request in this case continued to be in effect but was ignored.  As in Penokie v Michigan Technological University, 93 Mich. App. 650, 658; 287 NW2d 304 (1979):  "Since defendant failed to respond, that failure is treated as a final decision to deny the request. Moreover, since the request is deemed to have been denied for failure to respond, plaintiff need only make a showing in circuit court that the request was made and denied."

B)  Defendant's original exemptions and newly claimed exemption exhibit a pattern of arbitrary, capricious behavior in willfully and intentionally failing to comply with the FOIA.

Defendant originally claimed the two redacted elements on the payroll sheet (the SSCENT officer's name and the hours he worked in a week in March 2016) were reasonably exempt using a blanket law enforcement exemption, later morphed to a more specific exemption in the administrative appeal under MCL 15.243(1)(s)(ii) and (s)(v) respectively. 

1) Subsection (s)(ii) does not apply

A look at EXHIBIT 2, LPD Payroll Sheet, shows that the record in no way tells the position or duties of any officer, just what hours they worked for the time period and their employee number.  The chief and other officers are treated alike.  Leaving his name in the record does not "identify or provide a means of identifying a law enforcement undercover officer or agent or a plain clothes officer as a law enforcement officer or agent." (MCL 15.243(1)(s)(ii)), because nothing infers he is an undercover officer working for SSCENT. 

Conversely, redacting his name from the record while claiming this exemption let's everybody know that LPD has an undercover officer working for SSCENT and through a process of elimination, discover who that operative is.  Ironically, the invoked exemption drew attention to the officer and his work, the opposite effect of why the exemption exists.  Furthermore, defendant was already aware that plaintiff and other parties who may have been interested in the information provided, knew the identity of the officer and that he was working for SSCENT in a role that sometimes involved undercover work.

The defense the FOIA Coordinator provided at the administrative appeal was "My rationale was that releasing the name of the officer whose hours of work while assigned to the SSCENT drug team would undermine his ability to perform his duties, which many times call for him acting undercover."  (see EXHIBIT 9). 

Because (1)(s) exemptions are discretionary he included Chief Barnett's affidavit, which added that the name (and hours) was withheld from the six month old payroll record because somehow the officer's SSCENT duties would be compromised, and that the chief lacked the sole authority to release the information (see EXHIBIT 4).   In FOIA cases, "Exemptions are to be construed narrowly and "must be supported by substantial justification and explanation, not merely by conclusory assertions""  Penokie, supra. 

Neither the chief or coordinator would establish what authority he was referencing, but the only authority I have been provided for such disputes is the FOIA statute, which says that it is the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act (MCL 15.231) and deserve an explanation of the basis under FOIA or other statute for the determination that the public record, or portion of that public record, is exempt from disclosure (MCL 15.235(5)(a)). 

In our republic, the rule of law holds sway, not some uncredited and nebulous authority summoned by a police chief to protect a portion of his old payroll records.  As noted by this court in 'FOIA suit 1', the name of the undercover officer is already on non-exempt public records of the city and the court while he is and was acting under his official capacity; the release of a more innocuous payroll log showing he worked however many hours six months prior will not undermine anything.  The lack of disclosure, on the other hand, significantly undermines the public's confidence in the defendant's commitment to transparency in other issues more compelling than what is being sought here.

2)  Subsection (s)(v) does not apply

Similarly, the defendant claims the (s)(v) exemption applies, namely that the hours worked six months ago are police records that 'disclose operational instructions for law enforcement officers or agents'.  At the administrative appeal, the FOIA Coordinator opined:  "I concluded that releasing the hours the officer worked would represent a way to disclose operational instructions as said hours translate to work performed for the SSCENT drug team." 

How does one get any idea about "operational instructions" by discovering the amount of time worked during one week by a SSCENT officer on the defendant's police force six months prior to a FOIA request?   Instructions are, by definition, detailed information telling how something should be done, operated, or assembled.  If something can be learned about 'operational instructions' of SSCENT just by looking at old payroll records of one officer and finding they worked X hours on a certain day and worked no hours on another day, it hasn't been explained in this instance.  Try as I may, I cannot make the connection myself, nor has the defendant tried to explain it further in their brief. 

3)  Plaintiff's 2013 FOIA request for defendant's police payroll records was granted in full, despite having the same SSCENT officer on them, illustrating an inconsistent policy, arbitrary and capricious behavior

As noted and illustrated in the original complaint (EXHIBIT 12-14), a 2013 FOIA request for inspecting police the previous week’s payroll records from defendant was granted in full; the current SSCENT officer was in that same capacity at that time (EXHIBIT 15).  Defendant has seemingly acknowledged that there has been no change in policy or SSCENT that would justify this inconsistency, yet believe they had the discretion to make these portions exempt in October 2015.

When confronted with this 'precedent' of city policy, the defendant in their answer to this lawsuit was dismissive, and maintained they still had a right to retain the withheld portion of these records, even though at an earlier date their city attorney claimed there were no exemptions in similar police payroll records.  This establishes the issue that their decision in this case was not bound by their own established rules from the past. 

C)  The comprehensive actions of Defendant were both arbitrary and capricious

In Michigan law there are few yardsticks for arbitrary and capricious behavior, nor are these defined by statute.  There is however a four-part test for proof of “Arbitrary and Capricious” Agency Action at the federal level, and this four-part test is set out in a 1983 Decision of the United States Supreme Court:

Normally, an agency [decision] would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has

[1] relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

[2] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,

[3] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or

[4] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

Adapting this well-used legal standard to a state/local agency's decisions, we find that the rule the defendant invoked to exempt the officer's name and work hours did not logically come from FOIA statute or established administrative policy, as illustrated in this brief.  The rationale behind the exemptions used in this case are not supported by the facts in this case. 

The first part of the test is confirmed in that the FOIA statute does not include a viable reason for exempting the information.  Even if we consider that the civil action exemption may have applied at some point in this process, it clearly cannot be invoked after April 20, 2016 in this "continuing request for information", Krug, Supra. 

The second part follows when we consider that there is nothing typically exempt on a public body's payroll record, and that on this particular payroll record there was no indication at all that the struck out name was an undercover SSCENT officer (as noted, only the invoked exemption drew attention to that), and the amount of time he worked each day was irrelevant to anything concerning any other litigation of plaintiff's or his associates.

The third part of the test follows from Chief Barnett's affidavit, who claimed some higher authority was preventing him from disclosing the two bits of data he claimed were supported by statute, an argument that would be specious even if the exemptions were broadened substantially, however, as noted "Exemptions are to be construed narrowly and "must be supported by substantial justification and explanation, not merely by conclusory assertions""  Penokie, supra.  The SSCENT officer's name and actions were already exposed in numerous public records of the LPD and the court which were ruled non-exempt in 'FOIA suit 1'.

Finally, the fourth is best illustrated by the semi-conspiratorial method in which the defendant has used to prevent the public from seeing these portions of the record even though the rule of law has been against them from the start.  Chief Barnett's immaterial claims, FOIA Coordinator Alvarado's legally-baseless defenses of those claims with assertions of proxy-discovery motives of plaintiff, the administrative unanimous decision made by defendant's city council without discussion, the refusal of the defendant to reconsider the denial of the two exemptions after 'FOIA Suit 1' was for all intents and purposes completed and plaintiff publicly asserted he would take it to this court. 

The defendant almost immediately followed their answer to this complaint with a Motion for Summary Disposition written so as to pre-date the order for 'FOIA suit 1' that this court ordered them to prepare.  Plaintiff supplied an itemized list of all the costs to defendant before the next business day after this hearing.  Over two weeks later this lawsuit was served, but it would still take several more weeks after that to finalize the order, because it made the defendant's 'civil action exemption' more believable for this case, or at least made their actions seem less arbitrary and capricious. 

But because they have still not disclosed the record, they cannot stand behind this "Hail Mary' exemption without failing in their duty, as the exemption undeniably does not apply since at least April 20, 2016.  Not releasing a record when they haven't any proper exemption, means the defendant is currently withholding those records unlawfully from the public.  The chief, coordinator, council, and counsel of the city have all acted arbitrarily and capriciously in this case.  Defendant deserves no less than punitive damages, since FOIA's recent revisions has declared that punitive damages are warranted "if the court determines in an action commenced under this section that the public body has arbitrarily and capriciously violated this act by refusal or delay in disclosing or providing copies of a public record."MCL 15.240(7). 

D.  The Comprehensive actions of Defendant show bad faith and willful non-compliance with the FOIA (MCL 15.240b)

Moreover, the defendant's agents knowingly, willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this act or otherwise acted in bad faith in this instance.  The court shall additionally note that the public body has previously been assessed penalties for violations of this act.  Plaintiff prevailed in 'FOIA Suit 1' and was awarded costs and disbursements; Plaintiff as co-plaintiff also prevailed in a FOIA lawsuit after appealing to the Michigan Appeals Court in 2013, where they instructed this court to award the plaintiffs cost and disbursements for prevailing in their civil action. 

These considerations along with the facts of the case and the deliberative arbitrary and capricious decisions already alluded to throughout this brief indicate that the defendant should be held liable for their 'bad faith and baseless non-compliance.  'Bad faith' is defined in West's Encyclopedia of American Law as "The fraudulent deception of another person; the intentional or malicious refusal to perform some duty or contractual obligation." 

While there is hopefully no malice towards plaintiff, there has been an intentional refusal to share the non-exempt records with the public.  The best indicator of these intentions are the writings of the police chief and the FOIA Coordinator who believed they could be used by Gene Foster, effectively wishing to unlawfully and maliciously deny these writings to plaintiff because they may have been conveyed and found useful to Foster in his defense of criminal charges.   

In Taylor v Lansing Bd of Water & Light, 272 Mich App 200, 204-205; 725 NW2d 84 (2006), the court held that a literal interpretation of MCL 15.243(1)(v) allows “a party to obtain information by proxy that he or she would otherwise not be entitled to receive through FOIA."   It should also be noted that Foster was denied several records through discovery that were in possession of defendant that were also withheld from him by the County prosecutor who is also a contracted prosecutor for the defendant.

All actors of the defendant have illustrated 'bad faith' in performing their duties as public officials in violating the core provisions of the FOIA.  It started with Police Chief Barnett saying he hadn't the sole authority to release parts of six month old payroll records without offering any rationale why this trumped the FOIA.  It continued with FOIA Coordinator Alvarado saying the hours worked six months prior would be releasing records of ‘operational instructions’. 

It progressed through the defendant's city council, with the panel of seven adjudicators sworn to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the State of Michigan unanimously denying the records without any discussion of the merits of either side at an administrative appeal.  Finally, it concluded with the defendant's able counsel providing a potentially viable defense of the city's actions by claiming the civil action exemption-- and then failing to disclose those records after that other case was finalized and settled. 

They may yet disclose the exempted portions of the records at or before the motion hearing, thereby hoping to avoid some of the sanctions this court can impose, and they can claim an oversight has occurred.  But it becomes less believable when such oversights occurred throughout this case, the previous two FOIA cases with the defendant, and regularly through the years as I sought information from the local government, the defendant, that I live under, as per my right to do so via the FOIA.

The annual budget of the City of Ludington is between $5 and $6 million.  If this court sanctions a minimal $2500 fine for failure to comply with the FOIA (via MCL 15.240b) to be sent to the state's treasury it would amount to approximately 0.04% of the budget, a maximal $7500 fine would amount to approximately 0.1% of the budget.

 

                            V.  CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff respectfully requests that any summary judgment made should be in favor of the plaintiff, providing him with the unlawfully exempted portions of the record, costs, disbursements, and any deserved punitive damages to him and the state consistent with the relief requested in the original complaint.  May this court find that the defendant's motion is effectively moot, due to the failure in any subsequent disclosure of the records immediately following the conclusion of our other case.

Furthermore, this court should consider the defendant's ample annual budget, the facts of this case, and the past actions of the defendant with regards to FOIA violations in support of punitive damages under both MCL 15.240(7) and MCL 15.240b.  Plaintiff strongly believes such negligence by the defendants in handling FOIA requests in the future will continue if all they have to fear is a small stipend of a couple of hundred dollars paid out by their municipal insurance when their unlawful and arbitrary actions in handling their duty occurs.

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Good Luck Brother! Hope for justice to prevail!

They need a hefty slap' 

I'm still waiting for the fog to lift and dissipate from inside the heads of the public and the personnel at the LDN and MCP. How many court battles does it take for a private citizen to fight in order to reveal a corrupt City. These legal proceedings are being done on their behalf so they can recognize that those in power are abusing their authority. Without X's efforts Ludington would still be operating way outside of the law instead of being somewhat constrained. Hey Patti and Alway, get your heads out of your as_s and smell what real crap there is in the World. You two can't continue to ignore what is going on because it only reflects badly on you. Why would anyone trust information from either of these news agencies when they ignore or cover up the real stories involving corruption. X is doing the job that the press fails to do. Excellent work X. You have the only truthful and complete news coverage in Mason County.

I have to comment on the silly "best towns contest". Anytime people are allowed to vote multiple times and on a daily basis reveals how phony these types of contests are. Also how can Ludington be better than the likes of Los Angeles with it's diverse interests and attraction along with beautiful geographical surroundings including mountains, the ocean, forests, deserts, ect. As well as the massive entertainment industry, night life, museums, the arts and culture, ect. The stupidity is astounding.

Thanks for the compliments, Willy, and the assistance in trying to get our so-called local news agencies back into the realm of honest journalism again. 

As for the "Best Town's Contest", I have remained mute for the most part and have voted for Ludington myself while reviewing the material.  If you've been around here long enough like Willy has been, you probably remember the Reader's Digest contests a few years back when there was open voting on the "Best Small Town in America" for a couple of years.  

It proved very popular (albeit banal since you could manufacture a thousand votes per hour), but like this contest, you could vote multiple times a day, ten times per E-mail address you submitted.  The COLDNews, CVB, DDA, and other local government agencies encouraged people to vote for Ludington, and kept tabs on how the voting was going on.  Acting on my own initiative, I decided to support Walhalla, and over the course of the voting, I always kept busy enough stuffing the ballot boxes with nearly 100% of their votes to keep Walhalla ahead of Ludington (See this link).  And Walhalla always beat Ludington.

The above is a plea from one of the Reeds to vote early and often, with instructions on how to do it, placed in the Concerned Locals group.  The Downtown Ludington Board also had numerous postings on social media during the week where they advertised this so people could vote; being a self-admitted government agency, you had them doing this during times when you may have been paying them to do actual work.

Here, if I had wanted, I could have probably done the same thing since it was almost always a close vote.  But getting Ludington to finish topmost in the bracket on beach towns is a desired result simply because our leadership wants to dramatically change the beach in Ludington to accommodate their pet projects that will ruin the area (the West End Scheme).  This national showing illustrates that changing the top beach into something it isn't, isn't what the people who voted want.

I agree with you Willy. The rules state to vote one time and people are voting numerous times. How can this even be an unbiased vote. Most people living in Ludington have never ever been to Billings, Montanta. Don't take much to amuse the locals on silly sh!t. Now ask a lot of these silly voters how the local government officials run the county and they are clueless. The absolute numbing and dumbing of America!! Same applies for voting for the best ice cream. LMAO at the silliness of it.....

Yup guys, they can vote 50 times for silliness, and never give a hoot about what really matters in Ludington. It's not it's popularity, but it's infrastructure and honesty in handling public funds, and keeping user fees low for all, simply clueless.

Well today's the 17th, inquiring minds want to know what happened in the court today. Good news I hope.

Sorry about the delay in reporting what happened.  I showed up around 2:00 at the courtroom for the hearing.  The court reporter was having problems with the recording equipment, the MML Attorney and John Shay showed up about five minutes later.  After about a half hour of delay in trying to get the technical problem fixed, and failing, it was decided to reconvene down in the basement court usually used for Probate cases. 

The city's lawyer introduced a MI Supreme Court case in response to my response brief this day, which I nor Judge Wadel had time to review.  The judge asked a couple of questions, regarding this, acknowledged he had read all of the briefs, and decided to follow up with a judgment early next week, giving me the opportunity to review the case introduced and submit a response to what the defendant said it implied by the end of the week.  After the first reading of the case, I think I have a viable response to it, but (of course) I won't supply that until I polish it off and submit it to the court and the defendant later in the week.

Unless it was John Shay's day off, I have no idea why he was coming to the court for what would be over an hour to listen to what was going on.  I didn't see attending summary judgment court hearings where he wasn't needed as one of his duties as city manager.

Another quick and dirty delay to defuse the obvious outcome is my guess. Still can't admit any wrongdoing after all this time, and never will, even if found guilty. Pretty convenient to have this court recording equipment not working too, suspicious and capricious is my outlook. I would think that the city attorney Senior Carlos for FOIA would have been there, not Shay, but then again, his nose is in everyone's business nowadays, not on the infrastructure problems that are an emergency right now. That's waited over 10 years on his watch, why expedite it now?

Famous excuse to delay court proceedings. Equipment not working!! LMAO!! Only thing that works is the cash flowing into the court house. May you prevail against the giant out of control government system that not only resides in small town America, but is escalated right on up the ladder to the Federal level. Sad sorry state of affairs this entire USA we all live in.

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